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RECENT MINNESOTA CASES
Commercial Law-USURY

DEFENSE UNAVAILABLE TO GuARANTORS OF

LoAJs-Charmoll Fashions, Inc. v. Otto,
248 N.W.2d 717 (1976).
CORPORATE

-

Minn.

-,

In Charmoll Fashions, Inc. v. Otto,' the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the defense of usury was unavailable to persons signing a
corporate note as guarantors. This decision reflects current limitations
on the usury defense in Minnesota and suggests questions concerning its
future use.
The ancient prohibition against usury2 has changed significantly
through the ages.' Today, usury in Minnesota is a purely statutory defense' which, if successfully interposed, will void a contract.5 In recent
years, the scope of the defense has been narrowed by statutes' which,
for example, provide for different rates of interest in consumer transactions,' and by case law which defines the elements of the defense.8 The
248 N.W.2d 717 (1976).
1. - Minn. -,
2. The Mosaic law forbade Israelites from charging interest to a fellow Israelite. See
Exodus 22:25; Deuteronomy 23:19. But to a non-Israelite, interest could be charged. See
Deuteronomy 23:20. See also Ezekiel 18:5-13 (the penalty for exacting usury was death).
See generally Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws, 8 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 36,
36-39 (1941) (showing development of the law of usury).
3. See Blindman v. Industrial Loan & Thrift Corp., 197 Minn. 93, 101, 266 N.W. 455,
458-59 (1936) (Loring, J., dissenting) (describing history of law of usury); Berstein,
.Background of a Gray Area in Law: The Checkered Career of Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846
(1965).
4. See MINN. STAT. § 334.03 (1976) (declaring that usurious contracts are void); id. §
334.01 (fixing the legal rate of interest at 6% and prohibiting charging more than 8%); id.
§ 334.01(2) (exempting loans of $100,000 or more from the 8% ceiling but only until July
1, 1978).
5. See MINN. STAT. § 334.03 (1976).
6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 48.153 (1976) (12% annual interest may be charged on
installment loans of less than $25,000); id. § 52.14 (1% monthly interest may be charged
by credit unions); id. § 56.13 (1.25% to 2.75% interest per month may be charged by small
loan companies).
7. See MINN. STAT. § 334.16 (1976) (finance charge for open end credit sales limited to
1%per month). Technically, however, the interest charged on the sale of goods cannot be
labelled usurious for usury applies only to a loan of money. See Schauman v. Solmica
Midwest, Inc., 283 Minn. 437, 439, 168 N.W.2d 667, 669-70 (1969); Dunn v. Midland Loan
Fin. Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 553-55, 289 N.W. 411, 413-14 (1939).
8. Usury in Minnesota is defined as "taking or receiving more interest or profit on a
loan than the law permits." Schauman v. Solmica Midwest, Inc., 283 Minn. 437, 439, 168
N.W.2d 667, 669 (1969). To conclude that a transaction is usurious, the court must find:
(a) a loan of money or forbearance of a debt; (b) an agreement between the
parties that the principal shall be payable absolutely; (c) the exaction of a
greater amount of interest or profit than is allowed by law; and (d) the presence
of an intention to evade the law at the inception of the transaction.
Id. at 439, 168 N.W.2d at 669-70. Thus, in Schauman, the fact that the transaction
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Charmoll court continued the narrowing of the defense by drawing a fine
line between comakers and guarantors of corporate obligations.
In Charmoll, a loan was made for the purchase of equipment by a
corporation formed by the defendants. The plaintiffs had sold the equipment to the corporation, taking its note with ten percent interest. The
defendants had signed this note on behalf of the corporation, but also
signed a separate agreement, designated a "guarantee" clause, which
read in part:'
The undersigned shall jointly and severally be bound upon this guarantee to the holder . . . as if the obligation of the [corporate] maker...
were the primary obligation of the [defendants] and the [plaintiff]
shall not be required to proceed against the maker. . . prior to proceeding to collect under this guarantee, but may proceed directly
against the [defendants] ....
Upon default by the corporation, the plaintiffs sought to hold the
defendants liable on the guaranty. The defendants asserted the usury
defense, claiming the corporate-loan exception to the eight-percent
usury law" was inapplicable because the term "primary obligation" in
the guarantee clause rendered them comakers of the corporate loan. The
defense would void the contract." The plaintiffs, however, claimed the
defendants were guarantors of the note, precluding them from interposing the defense because in Minnesota, the defense may not be used if
the guarantors are obligated under a corporate note. The loan would
then be valid and the defendants obligated to pay.
The trial court concluded that the defendants were primarily obligated under the note, and thus not guarantors but comakers. The supreme court disagreed, relying heavily upon its decision in Dahmes v.
Industrial Credit Co.'3 In Dahmes, the situation was not dissimilar to
the situation in Charmoll;a corporation made a note which was guaranteed by persons interested in the corporation. However, the interested
involved a sale of property on credit did not make the transaction illegal because a seller

may charge one price for cash and another for credit, although the difference between the
prices would, if charged as interest, be usurious. Id. at 443-44, 168 N.W.2d at 672. But cf.
MINN. STAT. § 334.16 (1976) (open-end credit finance charge may not exceed 1% per
month).
9.
- Minn. at -, 248 N.W.2d at 718.
10. See MINN. STAT. §§ 334.01(1), .021 (1976).
11. See Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 574, 13 N.W.2d 739, 744 (1944); Mn.N.
STAT. § 334.03 (1976). The usury defense will not be available, however, if the loan is for

more than $100,000, see id. § 334.01(2) (expires July 1, 1978); if the transaction is disguised
as a corporate debt in order to avoid the usury law, see, e.g., Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern,
Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 196, 89 A.2d 654, 656 (1952); or if the borrower has prior knowledge of
the usurious character of the loan. See Nelson v. Dorr, 239 Minn. 423, 433, 58 N.W.2d
876, 882 (1953).
12. See Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 31, 110 N.W.2d 484, 488 (1961).
13. 261 Minn. 26, 110 N.W.2d 484 (1961), noted in 47 MINN. L. Rxv. 266 (1962).
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persons, the plaintiffs in Dahmes, had given personal notes and mortgages on their homestead to secure the corporate obligation which provided for twenty percent interest. When the corporation defaulted, the
lender sought to foreclose on the mortgages and to collect the notes. The
plaintiffs, successfully interposing the defense at the trial level, were
held liable on appeal. The "direct and unconditional" obligation which
the personal notes and mortgages provided for, the court said, did not
refer to the obligation on the corporate note.'" Rather, it referred to the
type of guaranty the plaintiffs had undertaken. The "direct and unconditional" liability meant only that the guaranty was absolute. Thus,
the plaintiffs, having guaranteed the corporate obligation, could not use
the defense of usury because "if an excessive interest rate does not
render the principal obligation illegal, it should likewise not affect the
undertaking of the guarantor . ... "15
The Charmoll court noted that although the corporate note and the
guaranty were in one document, the two agreements were separately
stated with signatures affixed to each."6 The fact that the two were
simultaneously executed did not change the effect of the agreements. 7
Use of the term "primary obligation" in the guaranty clause referred to
the fact that after default by the corporation, the holder of the note
could sue the guarantor without first having to sue the principal obligor. 18 According to the court, this clause defined a guaranty which was
absolute rather than conditional." The Dahmes court distinguished the
two types of guaranties by stating: 0
A contract of guaranty may be either conditional or absolute. If the
guaranty is absolute, the obligor becomes liable merely upon the failure
of performance by the debtor. A conditional guarantor, on the other
hand, is liable only upon the happening of the stated contingency, such
as, for example, suit against the principal debtor, exhaustion of security, or the like.
In Minnesota, in the absence of language to the contrary, a guaranty is
considered absolute.2 ' Because the Charmoll guaranty contained no limiting language, it was construed to be absolute.
14. 261 Minn. at 33-34, 110 N.W.2d at 488-89.
15. Id. at 31-32, 110 N.W.2d at 488.
16. __ Minn. at , 248 N.W.2d at 719.
17. Id. (by implication).
18. Id. at , 248 N.W.2d at 720.
19. Id.
20. 261 Minn. at 33, 110 N.W.2d at 488-89 (footnotes omitted). See Holbert v. Wermerskirchen, 210 Minn. 119, 121, 297 N.W. 327, 328 (1941); cf. MINN. STAT. § 336.3-416 (1976)
(defining contract of guarantor on a negotiable instrument). For examples of the two types
of guaranties, compare Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Foster, 196 Minn. 96, 264 N.W. 570
(1936) with State Bank v. Lauterbach, 198 Minn. 98, 268 N.W. 918 (1936).
21. See Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 33, 110 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1961);
Holbert v. Wermerskirchen, 210 Minn. 119, 121, 297 N.W. 327, 328 (1941).
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The defendants also argued that an acceleration clause in the note
made them comakers because it made the loan payable in full upon the
death or incapacity of one of the defendants, which suggested that the
loan was made personally to her. According to some authority,22 the
transaction might not be enforced if it is a personal transaction disguised as a corporate one to avoid the usury law. The court found no
evidence to support this argument, however, saying that the acceleration clause merely suggested that the defendant was a key figure whose
death or disability would affect the success of the corporation to such a
degree that the holder would deem itself insecure if she were unable to
direct the business. No liability on the guaranty, however, would be
created by the acceleration clause until the corporation defaulted on the
note.?
The decision raises a question which should, perhaps, be answered by
the legislature: Should comakers as well as guarantors of a corporate
loan be denied the defense of usury? The denial of the usury defense to
corporations stems from statutes which "in effect [repeal] usury laws
insofar as loans to corporations are concerned." 4 These statutes, which
are in force in many states, 5 have been held constitutional. 6 The rationale behind the policy includes an assumed equality in bargaining power
between corporations and lenders,2 the limited liability of corporate
22. See, e.g., Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 196, 89 A.2d 654, 656 (1952);
Walnut Discount Co. v. Weiss, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 161, 165, 208 A.2d 26, 27 (1965). See
generally Note, Incorporation to Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1968).
23. Minn. at , 248 N.W.2d at 721. However, the court indicated that this
defense is available only to the party who was the subject of the provision; it may not be
asserted by a fellow guarantor.
The court noted that the plaintiff may have engaged in conduct which may have supported a claim of tortious interference with business. See generally Johnson v. Gustafson,
201 Minn. 629, 277 N.W. 252 (1938). This claim, which was not asserted by the defendants
on appeal, was founded on the fact that when defendants negotiated for the sale of the
corporation, plaintiff insisted that it would hold one of the defendants personally liable
on the note should the negotiations result in a sale. This assertion, the court indicated,
was not justified "by the terms of the note. However, the court expressed no opinion on
the merits of the claim, saying "such activities do not change our usury law or the language in the note .
" -...
- Minn. at , 248 N.W.2d at 722.
24. Bichel Optical Labs., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (D.
Minn. 1971), aff'd, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2306 (1975); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(1)
(McKinney 1964).
26. See, e.g., 759 Riverside Ave., Inc. v. Marvin, 109 Fla. 473, 475, 147 So. 848, 849-50
(1933); Tennant v. Joerns, 329 Ill. 34, 40, 160 N.E. 160, 162 (1928) (per curiam); Country
Motors, Inc. v. Friendly Fin. Corp., 13 Wis. 2d 475, 478, 109 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1961).
27. See, e.g., Country Motors, Inc. v. Friendly Fin. Corp., 13 Wis. 2d 475, 478, 109
N.W.2d 137, 142 (1961); Krause, The Treatment of Usury in Bankruptcy Proceedings,29
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1082, 1096 (1954); Note, Usury in the Conflict of Law: The Doctrine of the
Lex Debitoris, 55 CAL. L. REV. 123, 206 (1967). But see N.Y. GEN. OBuG. LAW § 5-521(2)
(McKinney 1964) (corporations whose principal assets are one- or two-family dwellings
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stockholders,2" and the promotion of commercial interests.29 It has also
been suggested that high-risk corporate loans for new ventures would be
to finance at the low interest rates required
commercially impractical
3
by the usury statutes. 1
Guarantors of corporate loans are, like the corporation, precluded
from asserting the usury defense. 3' The guarantor's obligation is measured by that of the corporation, the principal obligor.3 2 If a defense is
unavailable to the principal obligor, it is also unavailable to the guarantor.33 This is analogous to situations in which the assignee of a contract
stands "in the shoes of the assignor," and cannot assert any defense
which the assignor could not.3 A comaker, as distinguished from a guarantor, may assert the usury defense.3 The distinction is drawn on the
basis of the comaker's obligation.3 Because the comaker has assumed
an independent obligation, the argument goes, his rights should not be
limited to those of the corporate maker. 7
This distinction, however, may be improperly drawn. Because both a
comaker and a guarantor have assumed a personal obligation to pay the
debts of the corporation, both should be fully informed about corporate
finances.3 Indeed, in theory, the comaker, who may find his liability
discharged by a successful assertion of the usury defense, has assumed
a greater obligation than the guarantor. A comaker is primarily liable
on the loan, 39 but a guarantor is secondarily liable because his liability
may assert usury defense if corporation was organized within six months prior to execution
of note and if note is secured by mortgage on the dwellings).
28. See Krause, supra note 27, at 1096 n.64; Note, supra note 27, at 209.
29. See Krause, supra note 27, at 1096-97; Note, Usury Laws and the Corporate
Exception, 23 MD. L. REV. 51, 55 (1963).
30. See Krause, supra note 27, at 1097 n.67.
Minn.
248 N.W.2d 717,
31. See, e.g., Charmoll Fashions, Inc. v. Otto, 719 (1976); Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 31, 110 N.W.2d 484, 488 (1961).
32. See Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 34, 110 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1961).
33. See id.
34. See Sorenson v. Greysolon Co., 170 Minn. 259, 263, 212 N.W. 457, 458 (1927); Frye
v. Metropolitan Music Co., 96 Minn. 535, 104 N.W. 1149 (1905) (per curiam). See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 269 (1970).
35. See Twin City Co-op Credit Union v. Bartlett, 266 Minn. 366, 369, 123 N.W.2d 675,
677 (1963); Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 36, 110 N.W.2d 484, 490 (1961)
(Gallagher, J., dissenting).
36. See Twin City Co-op Credit Union v. Bartlett, 266 Minn. 366, 369, 123 N.W.2d 675,
677 (1963) (by implication); Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 34, 110
N.W.2d 484, 489 (1961).
37. See Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 36, 110 N.W.2d 484, 490 (1961)
(Gallagher, J., dissenting).
38. See Note, supra note 27, at 214.
39. See, e.g., Twin City Co-op Credit Union v. Bartlett, 266 Minn. 366, 369, 123 N.W.2d
675, 677 (1963); Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 36-37, 110 N.W.2d 484,
490-91 (1961) (Gallagher, J., dissenting).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 6
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

does not arise until after the corporation has defaulted. 0 As a practical
matter, it is not until after default that either a guarantor or a comaker
will be called upon to pay. 4 It follows from this that if a lender is looking
for security from an individual when a loan is made for corporate purposes, all the lender has to do is require the individual to guarantee the
loan before advancing any money. Only when the loan is made at less
than usurious rates of interest would a lender consider having the individual sign as a comaker.
Allowing a comaker to assert the defense in an action to enforce a
corporate loan would only serve to thwart the underlying purpose of the
usury statute: to protect individuals from overreaching by lenders." The
proper place to draw the line between permitting the usury defense and
requiring payment at usurious interest is not at a stage where the lender
can control the result. Rather, the purpose of the loan should determine
the applicability of the usury defense.4 3 People organizing a business or
involved in business have access to advice which will aid them in their
decision whether or not to take the loan." People arranging for a personal loan ordinarily do not seek out legal or financial advice and rely
instead on the advice of the lender. 5 It is for the protection of the latter
group of people that the usury defense was enacted."6 Thus, the defense
of usury should be reserved for the benefit of individual borrowers only
when the loan is made for personal, not commercial, purposes.
In Charmoll, it was the nature of the defendants' obligation which
dictated the result, not the nature of the loan. The tenuous distinction
between a guarantor and a comaker was the basis of the decision to deny
the benefit of the usury defense to the defendants. A more coherent.
public policy, drawing the distinction between business and personal
loans, is called for in order that the usury defense be permitted only to
effectuate its underlying purpose. Because legislation concerning usury
has so far been fluid and responsive to social change, perhaps further
legislative action is needed to reflect this more coherent policy.
40. See Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261 Minn. 26, 34, 110 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1961).
41. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-416, Comment (if an indorser guarantees payment of a negotiable
instrument, his liability "becomes indistinguishable from that of a co-maker"). Compare
Twin City Co-op Credit Union v. Bartlett, 266 Minn. 366, 123 N.W.2d 675 (1963) with
, 248 N.W.2d 717 (1976).
Minn. Charmoll Fashions, Inc. v. Otto, 42. See Note, supra note 27, at 136-37. But see Shanks, Practical Problems in the
Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. REV. 327, 329-30 (1967).
43. See Note, supra note 22, at 1408-10. See also Shanks, supra note 42, at 347-50.
44. See Note, supra note 27, at 214.
45. See generally Nugent, The Loan-Shark Problem, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1941).
See also Note, supra note 27, at 136-37, 206.
46. See Adjustment Serv. Bureau, Inc. v. Buelow, 196 Minn. 563, 567, 265 N.W. 659,
661(1936).
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